WVU: Graduate Public Economics

	Public Economics 2 Econ 742 WVU, Spring 2012 Professor Roger D. Congleton office: 405 B&E / website: RDC1.net
.	PDF Syllabus with More Extensive Reading List and Details about Grades
Texts:	Class Room: B&E 401, Class Time: T&Th: 11:30 - 12:45	Snow News
	Reference Library: Same books as for Public Economics 1 plus the following additional references Stigler, G. J. (ed.) (1988) Chicago Studies in Political Economy. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Olson, M. (2000) Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books Congleton, R. D. (2011) Perfecting Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Besley, T. and T. Persson (2011) Pillars of Prosperity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. .	Office Hours: Thursdays, 2:30-3:45, Wednesdays 3:30-4:45 and by appointment
	Class Notes, available via this website, (will be updated during semester)	2012 PC Papers

Date	TENTATIVE COURSE OUTLINE (by subject block)**	Readings
1/10	(1.) Introduction: What is Public Economics II? There are many issues at the frontiers of Public Economics including normative, conceptual, theoretical, and empirical ones. This course will investigate a subset of those issues.	Congleton (2003, 2005) Knack and Keefer (1997) Sugden (1991), Caplan (2001)
1/12-19	(2.) Some Methodological Controveries in Public Economics, Alternative Positive and Normative Methodologies, importance of priors and honesty in research, errors and replicability, differences in models of man.	Buchanan (1964), Rawls (1955), Leamer (1983), Kirzner (1994) Makowski and Ostroy (1995) Frey (2002), Congleton (1984, 2007) , Paldam and Doucouliagos (2008)
1/24-2/9	(3.) Interest Groups and Regulation Interest Group Models versus Public Interest Models of Regulation. Positive and Normative rationales for Regulation. Natural and UnNatural Monopolies, Anti-trust versus Patents, Tariff Policies and other Barriers to Entry.	Stigler (1971) , Peltzman (1976) McChesney (1987, 1999), Wood and Anderson (1993), Hillman and Urspring (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2002), Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000), Nordhaus (1967) Lerner (2002)
2/14 - 2/23	(4.) Environmental Political Economy: Interest Group Models versus Public Interest Models of Regulation. Externalities and Commons Problems. Economic and Ideological Special Interests in non-optimal Solutions, Bureaucracy as an Institutionalized Interest Group, Niskanan Model.	Buchanan and Tullock (1975) Sandmo (1975), King (1986) Zywicki (1998) , Dryzek (1997) Congleton (1992, 1995 , 2001) Sandler and Murdoch (1997, 1998), Fredriksson (2003)
2/28 - 3/20	(5.) Rent Seeking, Rent Extraction, and Institutions: Toward a General Model of Interest Groups, Corruption, and Economic Efficiency: Rent-Seeking Losses, Rent Extraction, Corruptions as the Illegal Portion of Rent Seeking, Effects of Institutions on Rent-Seeking and Rent-Extracting activities.	Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2009) Tullock (1980), Congleton (1980), McChesney (1987), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Paldam (2002), Congleton and Lee (2009)
3/22	TAKE HOME EXAM DUE / and Reviewed	EXAM
3/26-3/30	Spring Break
4/3 - 4/10	(6.) Law, Politics, and Economic Development: Role of legal and political institutions in economic development. Culture and Trust as a transactions cost reducing "social capital." Empirical evidence on the effects of institutions and culture on economic development. Political Constitutions and Economic Policy	Becker (1968) , Demsetz (1970) Goetz (1984), Leamer (1983) Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) , Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) Rodrik et. al. (2002) , Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Congleton and Swedonborg (2006), Congleton (2011), Paldam and Bjornskov (2012)
4/12 - 4 / 19	(7.) International Public Economics: Transnational Externalitie and Treaty Organizations Treaties (Coasian Contracts) as solutions to international externality problems. Regulatory externalities. International organizations as treaty organizations. Principal agent problems in international organizations.	Persson and Tabellini (1999) Paldam (2002), Sandler and Murdoch (1997, 1998), Congleton (1992, 2006, 2006) Paldam and Doucouliagos (2008), Dreher (2009)
4/24 - 4 / 26	(8) Paper Workshop: 15 minute presentation of early paper drafts by students.	Paper Topics
4 / 26	Forest from the Trees Lecture / paper workshop	Congleton (2011)

5/ 4	15-22 Page research paper due midnight at roger.congleton@mail.wvu.edu on an applied public economics topic

	** A Few Dates may be changed.

Public Economics 2
Econ 742
WVU, Spring 2012

Professor Roger D. Congleton
office: 405 B&E / website: RDC1.net

PDF Syllabus with More Extensive Reading List and Details about Grades

Texts:

Class Room: B&E 401, Class Time: T&Th: 11:30 - 12:45

Snow News

Reference Library: Same books as for Public Economics 1 plus the following additional references

Stigler, G. J. (ed.) (1988) Chicago Studies in Political Economy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Olson, M. (2000) Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books

Congleton, R. D. (2011) Perfecting Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Besley, T. and T. Persson (2011) Pillars of Prosperity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
.

Office Hours:
Thursdays, 2:30-3:45,
Wednesdays 3:30-4:45
and by appointment

Class Notes, available via this website, (will be updated during semester)

2012 PC Papers

Date

TENTATIVE COURSE OUTLINE (by subject block)**

Readings

1/10

(1.) Introduction: What is Public Economics II?

There are many issues at the frontiers of Public Economics including normative, conceptual, theoretical, and empirical ones. This course will investigate a subset of those issues.

Congleton (2003, 2005)
Knack and Keefer (1997)
Sugden (1991), Caplan (2001)

1/12-19

(2.) Some Methodological Controveries in Public Economics, Alternative Positive and Normative Methodologies, importance of priors and honesty in research, errors and replicability, differences in models of man.

Buchanan (1964), Rawls (1955),
Leamer (1983), Kirzner (1994)
Makowski and Ostroy (1995)
Frey (2002), Congleton (1984, 2007) , Paldam and Doucouliagos (2008)

1/24-2/9

(3.) Interest Groups and Regulation Interest Group Models versus Public Interest Models of Regulation. Positive and Normative rationales for Regulation. Natural and UnNatural Monopolies, Anti-trust versus Patents, Tariff Policies and other Barriers to Entry.

Stigler (1971) , Peltzman (1976)
McChesney (1987, 1999), Wood and Anderson (1993), Hillman and Urspring (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2002), Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000), Nordhaus (1967) Lerner (2002)

2/14 - 2/23

(4.) Environmental Political Economy: Interest Group Models versus Public Interest Models of Regulation. Externalities and Commons Problems. Economic and Ideological Special Interests in non-optimal Solutions, Bureaucracy as an Institutionalized Interest Group, Niskanan Model.

Buchanan and Tullock (1975)
Sandmo (1975), King (1986)
Zywicki (1998) , Dryzek (1997)
Congleton (1992, 1995 , 2001)
Sandler and Murdoch (1997, 1998), Fredriksson (2003)

2/28 - 3/20

(5.) Rent Seeking, Rent Extraction, and Institutions: Toward a General Model of Interest Groups, Corruption, and Economic Efficiency: Rent-Seeking Losses, Rent Extraction, Corruptions as the Illegal Portion of Rent Seeking, Effects of Institutions on Rent-Seeking and Rent-Extracting activities.

Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2009)
Tullock (1980), Congleton (1980), McChesney (1987), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990),
Paldam (2002), Congleton and Lee (2009)

3/22

TAKE HOME EXAM DUE / and Reviewed

EXAM

3/26-3/30

Spring Break

4/3 - 4/10

(6.) Law, Politics, and Economic Development: Role of legal and political institutions in economic development. Culture and Trust as a transactions cost reducing "social capital." Empirical evidence on the effects of institutions and culture on economic development. Political Constitutions and Economic Policy

Becker (1968) , Demsetz (1970)
Goetz (1984), Leamer (1983)
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) , Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000)
Rodrik et. al. (2002) , Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Congleton and Swedonborg (2006), Congleton (2011), Paldam and Bjornskov (2012)

4/12 - 4 / 19

(7.) International Public Economics: Transnational Externalitie and Treaty Organizations
Treaties (Coasian Contracts) as solutions to international externality problems. Regulatory externalities. International organizations as treaty organizations. Principal agent problems in international organizations.

Persson and Tabellini (1999)
Paldam (2002), Sandler and Murdoch (1997, 1998),
Congleton (1992, 2006, 2006)
Paldam and Doucouliagos (2008), Dreher (2009)

4/24 - 4 / 26

(8) Paper Workshop: 15 minute presentation of early paper drafts by students.

Paper Topics

4 / 26

Forest from the Trees Lecture / paper workshop

Congleton (2011)

5/ 4

15-22 Page research paper due midnight at roger.congleton@mail.wvu.edu on an applied public economics topic

** A Few Dates may be changed.